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APUS INTL 412 WEEKLY FORUMS WKS 1-8

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INTL 412:  Espionage/Counterespionage FORUM WEEK 1 1. Describe the difference between a clandestine and a covert operation, and provide an example of each (using historical examples). 2. Why is "cover" so critical for a spy or intelligence professional to conduct their mission? Give an example of "good" cover and "bad" cover to demonstrate you understand the concept (again, you should use historical examples). 3. Describe what would make an operation a "counterespionage" one vs. "espionage." Provide a historical example of a famous counterespionage operation. Use examples, demonstrate you have read the materials, and apply critical thinking skills to earn maximum points on this forum. Over the years, the United States government has increasingly relied on covert and clandestine operations to succeed in foreign missions and policy implementation.  These operations are carried out under cloaks of secrecy to protect operators and sponsors, and preserve national security.  Both clandestine and covert operations put strong emphasis on concealing the details of the sponsors and participants involved in the operation; however, there are distinctions to each type of operation and their modes of deception. Typically identified as activities to impact international (and sometimes national), foreign, economic or military policy (Congressional Research Service, CRS, 2018), the outcomes of covert operations, once completed, do not always remain outside  the public spotlight.  The goal is to keep sponsors in strong positions of plausible deniability and enable them to succeed in military and diplomatic missions. Covert operations should be undetected while in progress, but the outcome may be easily observed. For example, special operations teams secretly inserted behind enemy lines to destroy a high-value target. Covert actions are typically carried out concealing the US government's role, and without publicly acknowledging US participation. The infamous and still debated Executive Order amendments (123333) declared that the US government's role in covert activity must never be acknowledged publicly.  Another major difference between covert and clandestine operations is the participants that are tasked with the execution of each operation. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is tasked with the mission of conducting covert operations, while the Department of Defense (DOD) coordinates clandestine activities (Erwin 2013). Covert activities basically provide the government with cover, aiding the government in attaining their foreign policy objectives (Daugherty 2004). While covert actions are team-oriented and goal focused, clandestine operations involve a series of intelligence information gathering which can then be utilized by other security entities to succeed in their specific missions.  Clandestine activity includes secret missions conducted and coordinated by the military in hostile territories with total secrecy (Erwin 2013).  The intelligence information collected during a clandestine operation can includes photographs, signals (SIGINT) human (HUMINT) and cyber intelligence (CYBINT). These intelligence collection methods in clandestine activities aid in producing vital intelligence to conduct successful covert operations and other key military missions. The aim of intelligence gathering in clandestine operations is to aid the US government and security agencies to ascertain the multiple details of their targets or goals, including strengths, weaknesses, and opportunity.  Clandestine and covert operations can be coordinated jointly or separately. This is mainly because in some clandestine operations can be executed with the aim of supporting covert and military activities. For a clandestine operation to be conducted it requires a presidential approval whereas covert operations are executed based on Presidential Finding (Daugherty 2004). The Presidential Findings are essential and it enables the head of state to determine the need of conducting covert operations before approving any covert mission (Erwin 2013). EXAMPLE:  BAY OF PIGS (COVERT): Eisenhower authorized the CIA to conduct a covert operation to rid the island of its self-appointed leader, Fidel Castro.  The CIA formulated a plan to recruit Cuban exiles living in the Miami area. It would train and equip the exiles to infiltrate Cuba and start a revolution to ignite an uprising across the island and overthrow Castro.  President John Kennedy had "lied" to the UN about the airstrikes he authorized for the operation and eventually cancelled the second wave of airstrikes, and the mission ended in complete failure.   EXAMPLE: BAT or Project X-Ray (CLANDESTINE):  After a civilian dentist suggested to President Roosevelt that one million bats with tiny incendiary devices attached to them could be released over Japan to ignite a firestorm among houses constructed of wood and paper, bats were clandistinely collected from Carlsbad Caverns, NM.  Developers designed a parachute container to house the bats during their descent from a highflying airplane and engineers produced tiny incendiary devices.  The armed bats burned down a hangar after crawling into the rafters of a building.    Congressional Research Service. 2018. Covert Action and Clandestine Activities of the Intelligence Community: Selected Definitions in Brief.  Retrieved from:  https://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R45175.pdf   Daugherty, W.J., 2004. Approval and Review of Covert Action Programs Since Reagan. International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 17(1), pp.62-80.   Erwin, M.C., 2013, April. Covert Action: Legislative Background and Possible Policy Questions. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS WASHINGTON DC CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE.   Wallace, Robert and H. Keith Melton. 2009. Spycraft: The Secret History of the CIA's Spytechs, from Communism to Al-Qaeda. London: Plume. FORUM WEEK 2 In approximately 250-500 words, comment on the following: Describe the development of espionage – primarily human intelligence, imagery intelligence, and signals intelligence – covering the period from before WWI, the inter-war years, and to WWII. (Narrow down your time frame - don't try to cover 170 years!!!) What were the major advancements of that time? What cases, activities, or agents stand out significantly in that time period, and why? I found the assigned reads for this forum offered great insight into the history of espionage and counterespionage.   I once heard of a movie about George Washington's spies and assumed it was a comedy, but now I find out it actually was not.  This has definitely stimulated my interest and I plan to look into it in the future.   For this week’s forum, I chose to dig into the period of Japanese Intelligence in pre-WWII years.   Rafalko goes into great detail of the key elements that transformed espionage during this time (2011).  One of those elements was the importance and continuous adaptability and evolution of the technical elements.  The breaking of codes and deciphering of communications between important Japanese diplomats was essential to the success of both American espionage and counterespionage activities. The information war that was being waged would determine who would have the upper hand. In order to win the information war,  an American code-breaking operation called “Black Chamber” had been initiated. The Black Chamber was a small group of clerks, linguists and cryptoanalysts that made up the ultra-secret operation funded by the American State Department and US Navy. One of the organization's best-known triumphs was the breaking of the Japanese diplomatic code in 1921 prior to the Washington Armament Conference of 1921-22.  The Armament Conference was a series of post-World War I arms control talks and "because of the work of the Black Chamber, U.S. negotiators knew in advance what reductions in the size of their fleet the Japanese negotiators would accept, and the Americans negotiated the Japanese down to that level" (Barnes 1990).  Eventually, in 1937, a highly sophisticated machine, which the Americans called “Purple,” became the means of coding and ciphering all important diplomatic traffic by the Japanese. It took nearly four years for the United States to crack this system.  In an interesting anecdote, "The strain of the endeavor, however, led to a nervous breakdown and William Friedman's (head of the Signals Intelligence Services) retirement as a Lt. Col. in the Signal Corps reserve" (Rafalko 2011). From then on, much was gained through the conversations deciphered, including the interception of communications that laid out a Japanese plan to more thoroughly utilize businesses located in the United States for intelligence gathering.  Japan started to drastically increase its counterespionage operations as of early 1941. It  had already been common practice for the Japanese to target organizations such as the Communist Party as well as monitoring "first hand and newspaper reports, with regard to military movements, labor disputes, communistic activities and other similar matters" (Rafalko 2011).  On top of that, by April 1941, Japanese agents were directed to attempt to take advantage of the ongoing labor strikes and make connections within labor unions. Although the depictions above are only a portion of the kinds of efforts Japan was establishing and augmenting in the 1941 era,  it is obvious that Japanese intelligence and propaganda activities during those years illustrate the extent of Tokyo's effort to penetrate US operations and those of other countries in the hemisphere.  In anticipation of a possible crisis, the FBI was prepared to take into custody and then detain all persons whose activities endangered or exposed US efforts in preparation for an anticipated World War (ONI 1941).   Along with all of the other intelligence gathering and psychological analyzing that went on leading up to our involvement in WWII,  Japanese plans, projects and operations were made much more clear thanks to the technology-enabled decryption of important conversations.     Barnes, Bart.  1990.  BLACK CHAMBER' CODE-BREAKER EDNA RAMSAIER YARDLEY DIES.  Washington Post March 21, 1990.  Retrieved from:   https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1990/03/21/black-chamber-code-breaker-edna-ramsaier-yardley-dies/94934048-9aee-4138-ba2e-efe7d0241f1e/?utm_term=.521f11799d3d ONI, Office of Naval Intelligence.  1941.  JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE AND PROPAGANDA IN THE UNITED STATES DURING 1941.  Prepared by the Counter Subversion Section, Office of Naval Intelligence, from information received from various sources.  December 4, 1941.  Retrieved from:  http://www.mansell.com/eo9066/1941/41-12/IA021.html Rafalko, Frank J. ed. “Magic” In Counter Intelligence Reader: American Revolution to World War II. Vol 2 (National Counterintelligence Center), 115-128, accessed March 11, 2014, http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/docs/ci2/2ch2_a.htm. FORUM WEEK 3 In approximately 250-500 words comment on the following: The Venona Project was an important chapter in US intelligence history. Comment on the major espionage themes you learned from this week's readings (pick anything you want to discuss). Here are a few examples to help get you started: What did the deciphering of Soviet messages teach us about Soviet espionage techniques? Who was vulnerable to Soviet recruitment and why? Why did some Americans feel the need to aid the Soviet Union and harm the US? What cover stories worked well for spies in the US? What impact did spying have on the US or Soviet atomic weapons program? Use examples, demonstrate you have read the materials, and apply critical thinking skills to earn maximum points on this forum. Show your sources as well--it assists in the rigor of your thinking.    I chose this element of the Venona Project - the compromise of the federal government and intelligence agencies - because it not only blew my mind, I recognized a lot of coincidental incidents and events corresponding with the "deep state" and embedded leftists and what is going on in Washington, D.C. and dismissed as conspiracy theories.   I am not being political, just observational.  Thanks!        The Venona project was a counter-intelligence program initiated by the United States Army Signal Intelligence Service (SIS), a forerunner of the National Security Agency (NSA).  The project lasted from 1943 to 1980, decrypting messages sent by Soviet Union intelligence agencies, including its foreign intelligence service and military intelligence services. The project produced some of the most important breakthroughs for western counter-intelligence, including the discovery of the Cambridge spy ring and the exposure of Soviet espionage targeting the Manhattan Project.  Venona was one of the most sensitive secrets of United States intelligence and remained secret for over a decade after it ended in 1980.  The project itself was not declassified until 1995.      The Venona Project began because Carter Clarke, Chief of the U.S. Army's Special Branch, "did not trust Joseph Stalin" (Hayes and Klehr 1999).  Clarke's concern was the result of  unsubstantiated rumors about German-Soviet peace negotiations and he was determined to discover whether such negotiations were underway.  At first, the mission of this small program was to  exploit Soviet diplomatic communications, but eventually the project came to include espionage acts, and it was in this realm that Venona contributed to America's intelligence capacities in ways that still reverberate today.        On Christmas Day, 2000, Robert Novak wrote:     The president's most trusted adviser is a Soviet agent.     The nation's leading nuclear scientist is turning secrets     over to the Kremlin. The entire federal government is      honeycombed     with Communists. American intelligence     agencies are infested with Russian spies. Soviet agents     are working in the offices of renowned American columnists,     and one beloved journalist is actually on Moscow's payroll.                                           (Weekly Standard 25 December 2005, 1-3)      Novak was not writing the first page of a grade B spy novel, he was citing proven facts of the astounding Soviet penetration of the United States during Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration.  The Venona messages connected information from Soviet archives and U.S. government investigations, providing a clear picture of Soviet espionage against the United States.  Soviet influence in the Roosevelt administration eliminated every opportunity for an early Nazi surrender to the Western allies; hastened the Kremlin's development of the atom bomb, permitting Stalin to give the green light to the Communist invasion of South Korea. The result in each instance was heavy loss of life by American soldiers  (Romerstein, Eric and Henry Breindel  2000). The release of the Venona files categorically settled many debates, and laid out the truth of many disputed incidents, many of which had existed for over 50 years.  Decrypted Venona messages proved that Julius Rosenberg and  Alger Hiss undeniably were spies. The first 1995 Venona release "sent shock waves through the ranks of the Rosenberg defenders" (Novak 2000).  Whittaker Chambers and Elizabeth Bentley, ostracized and demonized by the elite and embedded bureaucrats, were also vindicated.  These former spies had become government witnesses after years of soul-searching, "only to be called liars by the Left and vilified in numerous books and articles" (Novak 2000).  The Venona Secrets also provided unsettling data confirming that the Communist Party USA was a propagandist, rather than political, party.   Most chilling, Venona provided evidence that nearly all of the agents of the Narodny komissariat vnutrennikh del People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD), Stalin's  brutal secret police, were working for the Communist Part, the same demographic that General William Donovan had expansively placed throughout the federal and military intelligence agencies because we were fighting the Nazis and not the Soviet Union. I consider this timeline a strong object lesson in the fallacy of ever subscribing to the conventional wisdom of the day.      Hayes, John Earl and Harvey Klehr. 2000. Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America.  Hartford CT: Yale University Press. Novak, Robert. 2002.  Stalin's Agents.  The Weekly Standard. 25 December 2000.  Romerstein and Breindel.  2000. The Venona Secrets: Exposing Soviet Espionage and America's Traitors 2000).   NY New York: Regnery Press. FORUM WEEK 4 In approximately 250-500 words discuss one of the following:   Discuss the role that espionage and counterespionage have played in a major crisis or war of the Cold War -- such as the Berlin Airlift, the Korean War, the Iranian coup of 1953, the Suez Canal 1956, Gary Powers and the U2 shoot-down, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Vietnam War, the Iranian Hostage Crisis, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Lebanon 1983, etc. Discuss the role that espionage and counterespionage have played in a major policy decision -- such as George Kennan's 'Long Telegram', the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the US policy of containment, the US policy of flexible response, the US policy of detente, the opening with Communist China, etc.  In the 1980s, the Reagan administration’s tough foreign policy and massive military buildup convinced the Soviet leadership that Washington might be preparing a nuclear strike against Moscow.   Soviet General Secretary Yuri Andropov warned US envoy Averell Harriman that the Reagan administration's continuing actions were moving the two superpowers toward "the dangerous 'red line'" of nuclear war through "miscalculation" in June of 1983 (Fischer 2014).   Not everyone in the political world or Intelligence Community (IC) agreed that Adropov's statements portrayed genuine concerns, but were rather  an attempt to gain geopolitical advantages, including stopping the deployment of Pershing II and Cruise nuclear missiles in Western Europe (National Security Agency (NSA) Archives 2013). "This would not be the first time that Soviet leaders used international tensions to mobilize their populations" (Fischer 2014). Early in November, 1983, NATO began its annual war game, Able Archer, designed to simulate a nuclear attack on Warsaw Pact targets. The Soviet response was unprecedented. Nuclear-capable bombers and Soviet fighter groups in East Germany and Czechoslovakia were placed on unusual levels of alert. All non-reconnaissance flights over Warsaw Pact territory were grounded. Soviet nuclear submarines raced for the protective cover of the Arctic ice.  Additionally,  Moscow incorrectly informed its KGB and GRU stations that U.S. forces were mobilizing in Europe. Air bases in East Germany and Poland were put on alert "for the first and last time during the Cold War" (NSA Archives 2013).   In 1990, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board determined that during the critical years when the Kremlin was reassessing US intentions, the US intelligence community did not react quickly to or think deeply about the early signs of that change.  The war scare indicators began appearing in the early 1980s and the first intelligence analysis to address this was not written until 1984. At the time it was written, the US knew very little about Kremlin decision-making.    Many Western observers dismissed the war scare because they considered a surprise nuclear attack out of touch with reality or just plain irrational. They based their views on their certainty that there was no objective threat of a US attack; however,  viewing the Soviet war scare as nothing more than fear tactics may have led the West to underestimate a Soviet preemptive strike, either as a result of miscalculation or by design to reverse the adverse "correlation of forces" (Fischer 2014). Two Soviet actions - the development of Operation RYaN, the largest peace-time intelligence gathering operation in history, and the shooting down of Korea Flight 007 can be traced to Soviet fears in the light of the United States' growing military procurement.   In another scathing report by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the IC's collections and activities were cited as superficial and perfunctory due to the seeming irrationality of Soviet fears (NSA Archives 2013).   There was no attempt to codify or categorize meaningful steps by the Soviet Union to increase defense preparedness. These included crash programs to build additional ammunition and storage bunkers at Bulgarian airfields; institution of regulations to bring tactical missile brigades from peacetime conditions to full readiness; creation of a unique Soviet naval infantry to repel amphibious landings; and testing of command post aircraft in simulated electromagnetic pulse (EMP) environments.  Moreover, other than fear-mongering, American intelligence failed to comprehend the actual mindset behind the Soviet Union's actions and responses to the Reagan administration (Downing 2018). With the improvement in US-Soviet relations after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985, the domestic war scare subsided as quickly as it had emerged. As former secretary of defense Robert Gates admitted, the world may have been on the brink of nuclear war and not even known it. "After going through the experience at the time,  I don't think the Soviets were crying wolf. They may not have believed a NATO attack was imminent in November 1983, but they did seem to believe that the situation was very dangerous" (Ermarth 2003).  After years of debate in the intelligence community, a highly classified review of all materials held by US intelligence agencies concluded the same thing.  "The lessons of 1983 are clear.  Arrogance in foreign policy increases the danger of miscalculation and we would be wise to remember that fear and misunderstanding once nearly led us down the path to Armageddon" (Downing 2018). Downing, Taylor.  2018.  1983 The World at the Brink.  NY: Little, Brown.     Ermarth, Fritz. 2003.  Observations on the "War Scare of 1983" from an Intelligence Perch.  Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact.  Fischer, Ben.  2014.  Threat Perception, Scare Tactic, or False Alarm?  CIA Journal Studies in Intelligence.  http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/declassified-articles-studies-intelligence-ic%E2%80%99s-journal-intelligence-professional Mark Kramer, "The Able Archer 83 Non-Crisis: Did Soviet Leaders Really Fear an Imminent Nuclear Attack in 1983? National Security Agency Archives.  2013.  The 1983 War Scare: "The Last Paroxysm" of the Cold War Part I.  Electronic Briefing Book No. 426.  Washington, D.C. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB426/ FORUM WEEK 5 In approximately 250-500 words comment on the following: Illustrate the role that espionage and counterespionage have played in major policy decisions and crises in the post-Cold War era.  Choose a major crisis or war of the post-Cold War era -- such as Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Operation Desert Storm (Gulf War I) 1991, Somalia 1993 (Black Hawk Down), Bosnia (IFOR/SFOR), Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan), Operation Iraqi Freedom, etc., or a major policy decision -- the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II 1991-1993, the Global War on Terror, etc.  This is an opinion based on one interpretation of the events in Libya, there are many others … The Pre-Iraq War intelligence is a glaring example of bad intelligence and its extraordinary impact on the policies of President Bush and the military as a whole.  There is still considerable debate about the responsibility (and deception)  of the CIA, the incompetence of intelligence analysts and departments, or a combination of the two as the leading factors in the debunked intelligence that led to the War.  Like a lot of people I know, I haven't come to firm conclusions about exactly what happened. I believe a more sinister and corrupt policy developed and employed by Hillary Clinton's State Department through the use of intelligence and intel leaders was the Obama administration's Libya policy,  based on rumors and delivered in large part by a Hillary confidant whom President Obama refused to allow in the White House, Sidney Blumenthal.   Six years after the fall of Muammar Gadhafi, Libya remains in a chaotic state. The United Nations-backed government struggles to exert control over territory held by rival factions, intensifying geographical and political divisions between the East, West, and South. Terrorist groups and armed militias exploit the turmoil, using the nation as a base for radicalization and organized crime, and pose a threat to the region and beyond (Hoff 2016). On New Year's Eve, 2015, close to 4,000 Hillary Clinton emails were released by the State Department.   The emails confirmed Hillary-backed rebel war crimes; special ops trainers inside Libya within a month of the earliest protests which broke out in the middle of February 2011 in Benghazi;  Al Qaeda embedded in the US-backed opposition;  Western nations jockeying for Libyan oil;  the origins of the Viagra mass rape claims and, most importantly, Gaddafi's plans for Libyan gold and silver reserves to begin to compete with European currency. An intelligence brief dated  March 27, 2011 prepared by Blumenthal contained strong evidence of war crimes by the NATO-backed rebels.  Under attack from allied Air and Naval forces, Libyan Army troops began  to desert to the rebel side in increasing numbers over time.  Two rebel commanders sourced in the brief stated their troops continued to execute all foreign mercenaries captured in the fighting (Blumenthal 2011). Gaddafi was known to make use of European and other international security and infrastructural contractors, however, there had never been any evidence to suggest that these were targeted by the Libyan rebels. There is, however, ample documentation by journalists, academics, and human rights groups demonstrating that black Libyan civilians and sub-Saharan contract workers, a population favored by Gaddafi in his pro-African Union policies, were targets of “racial cleansing” by rebels who saw black Libyans as tied closely with the regime. Black Libyans were commonly branded as “foreign mercenaries” by the rebel opposition for their perceived general loyalty to Gaddafi as a community and subjected to torture, executions, and their towns “liberated” by ethnic cleansing. This is demonstrated in the most well-documented example of Tawergha, an entire town of 30,000 black and “dark-skinned” Libyans which vanished by August 2011 after its takeover by NATO-backed NTC Misratan brigades (Fortre 2012).  In what was termed a simple “popular uprising” external special operatives were already “overseeing the transfer of weapons and supplies to the rebels” including “a seemingly endless supply of AK47 assault rifles and ammunition” (Hoff 2016). After Muammar Gaddafi was killed, hundreds of migrant workers from neighboring states were imprisoned by fighters allied to the new interim authorities. They accused the black Africans of having been mercenaries for the late ruler. Thousands of sub-Saharan Africans have been rounded up since Gaddafi fell.  It appears that Clinton was getting personally briefed on the battlefield crimes of her beloved anti-Gaddafi fighters long before some of the worst of these genocidal crimes took place (Scott and Becker 2016).  The email of the intelligence briefs identify French President Nicholas Sarkozy as leading the attack on Libya with five specific purposes in mind: to obtain Libyan oil, ensure French influence in the region, increase Sarkozy’s reputation domestically, assert French military power, and to prevent Gaddafi’s influence in what is considered “Francophone Africa.”   The great fear reported was that Libya might lead North Africa into a high degree of economic independence with a new pan-African currency (Forte 2012). This kind of intelligence collection carried the day during Hillary's State Department reign. Early in the Libyan conflict Secretary of State Clinton formally accused Gaddafi and his army of using mass rape as a tool of war.  Although numerous international organizations, like Amnesty International, quickly debunked these claims, the charges were uncritically echoed by Western politicians and major media.  In later intelligence briefs,  Blumenthal cited so-called credible sources  that Qaddafi adopted a rape policy and had even distributed Viagra to troops. Not only did Defense Secretary Robert Gates promote this bizarre theory on CBS News’ “Face The Nation,” but the  Viagra rape fiction made international headlines as U.S. Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice made a formal charge against Libya in front of the UN Security Council (Hoff 2016). Removing and replacing Gadaffi was Hillary Clinton's pet project.  Not only was the State Department aware of the spurious nature of what Blumenthal called “rumors” originating solely with the rebels, they  did nothing to stop false information from rising to top officials who then gave them “credence.”  The Viagra mass rape hoax appears to have been created by Blumenthal himself (Hoff 2016). Blumenthal, Sidney.  2011.  For: Hillary - From: Sid - Re: Lots of new intel; Libyan army possibly on verge of collapse.  UNCLASSIFIED.  United States State Department.   March 27,  2011.   https://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/110327-new-intel-State-Dept.pdf Blumenthal, Sidney.  2011. For: Hillary - From: Sid - Re: France's client & Qaddafi's gold.  UNCLASSIFIED.  United States State Department.  https://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/110402-France-client-gold-State-Dept.pdf Forte, Max.  2012. Slouching Towards Sirte. NATO's War on Libya and Africa.  Quebec CA: Baraka Books. Hoff, Brad.  2016. Hillary Emails Reveal True Motive for Libya Intervention.  Foreign Policy Journal  (January 16).  Shane, Scott and Becker, Joe.  2016.   A New Libya with Very Little Time Left.  New York Times, February 27. 2016.  https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/28/us/politics/libya-isis-hillary-clinton.html FORUM WEEK 6   In approximately 250-500 words comment on the following: Assess the effect of technological changes on espionage and counterespionage during the Cold War era.  Choose a particular intelligence discipline and its associated spy technology, and assess how it changed over time during the Cold War.  For example, human intelligence or imagery/geospatial intelligence, and cameras; signals intelligence and electronics; human intelligence and audio recording technology; etc. After the end of World War II there was explosive growth and evolution in technological developments and disciplines (including collection, processing and analysis) within the US intelligence system.  New technological capabilities on both sides, East and West,  offered opportunities for new weapons and new collection techniques in an era which became known as the Cold War.   With the the scars of war still fresh in America's national memory, the prospect of new Soviet capabilities led US policymakers to embark on an aggressive path to understand not only the advancing US technologies, but also the extent and changing nature of Soviet capabilities. United States' policymakers were determined to obtain data on Soviet weapons developments and operational concepts, which required identifying important new systems and developing new technical means for collecting and processing such data.  These  new collection targets required more sophisticated means of collection, which in turn required new technical analysis techniques and capabilities.  In other words,  the need for scientific and technical intelligence on the Soviet Union generated a whole new set of requirements for new sources and methods, many of which remain current today. Both the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Intelligence Community's (IC's) new and innovative collection approaches, including overhead systems to collect images, allowed US analysts to discover the physical characteristics and locations of  Soviet weapons, test ranges, operational sites, and support structures (KGB 1977). The lack of hard intelligence facts and having few human intelligence resources within the Soviet Bloc were the key drivers in developing both US aircraft satellite imaging and signals intelligence collection systems. The Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI), along with Electronic Intelligence (ELINT), were both key domains in the changes and reform in US intelligence collections and procedures.  ELINT included both radars and Foreign Instrumentation Signals, or FIS.   The FIS and "telemetry" terms were often used interchangeably.  FIS focused on electromagnetic emissions associated with the testing and deployment of non-US systems that may have either military or civilian applications, including telemetry; beaconry; electronic interrogators; tracking, arming, fusing and command signals, and video data links (Bukharin 2007). The CIA's ELINT efforts furthered its scientific and technical pursuits through the 1950s. With the advent of the U-2 and later technical collection programs, it continued to grow.  By the time  the Department of Scientific and Technical Intelligence Analysis (DS&T)  activity was consolidated at the CIA (1962) there were well-established organizational units dedicated to scientific and technical intelligence that are still in use today.  Throughout the Cold War,  the Western intelligence community allocated most resources and time on surveillance systems to estimate Soviet capabilities (Clark 1996). Throughout the Cold War, the US Intelligence effort against the Soviet Union was countered with a highly effective system of countermeasures.  It is clear, however, that long-range technical systems proved to be the best collection sources for the United States, allowing for successful tracking of many aspects of the Soviet nuclear program. Overhead imagery, in particular, enabled the detection and analysis of critical elements of the Soviet nuclear infrastructure. The US Atomic Energy Detection System (USAEDS), designed to monitor radioactive emissions from nuclear explosions and nuclear material processing, yielded important data on the development of Soviet nuclear weapons, science and technology. Because of the Soviets' sophisticated and deceptive countermeasures,  the USSR's nuclear program was an exceptionally hard target (Smith 2007). The lack of reliable on-the-ground intelligence continually made it difficult for the West to understand important developments inside the Soviet nuclear complex, which resulted in significant intelligence gaps.    Bukharin, Oleg. 2007.  The Cold War Atomic Intelligence Game, 1945-70.   Central Intelligence Agency Library.   https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol48no2/article01.html Clark, Robert.  1996.  Scientific and Technical Intelligence Analysis. The Birth and Development of Scientific Intelligence.   CIA Historical Review Program.  Approved for Release 1994.   https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol19no1/html/v19i1a06p_0001.htm KGB Academy Textbook.  1977.  History of the Soviet Organs of State Security.  Moscow: KGB, 1977.  www.fas.harvard.edu/~hpcws/documents.htm Smith, Clarence. 2007.  CIA's Analysis of Soviet Science and Technology.   Central Intelligence Agency Library.  https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/watching-the-bear-essays-on-cias-analysis-of-the-soviet-union/article04.html FORUM WEEK 7 Assess the effect of technological changes on espionage and counterespionage during the post-Cold War era.  Choose a particular intelligence discipline and its associated spy technology, and assess how it changed over time during the post-Cold War era.  For example, human intelligence or imagery/geospatial intelligence, and digital cameras; signals intelligence and encryption technologies; human intelligence and wireless technology; etc.  Use examples, demonstrate you have read the materials, and apply critical thinking skills to earn maximum points on this forum. Show your sources as well--it assists in the rigor of your thinking. Outside of proxy wars, there was little direct fighting during the Cold War.  Both (all) sides  competed to develop more capable weapons and scientists worked on secret projects to develop weapon systems and important scientific endeavors.  Important everyday technologies emerged from military laboratories, such as liquid crystal displays and carbon fibers. In other areas, such as oceanography, scientists met strategic needs  to understand conditions underwater in order to hunt submarines.    In the Cold War, 'analogue metadata' managed information about people, places, meetings, connections, patterns and important details.  In the coming decades, scientific endeavors, metadata, and statistical analysis of big data, are likely to make it much more difficult to place spies under cover and have them conduct covert activities. A spy can change a lot of things about him or herself for purposes of deception, but not his DNA, and variant DNA scanners may be one of the key technologies in the future.   When you consider the proliferation of biometric scanners in airports and city streets, the difficulties involved in inserting clandestine operatives for covert operations become even more profound. Conducting long-term analysis of big data may effectively limit the need for some aspects of traditional tradecraft.    The Senate Select Committee has continually expressed the need for the US intelligence community to share intelligence with the United Nations on a routine basis.  Future national security will mean a pluralized system of  global governance, across which citizens are likely to spread their loyalties and appeals for safety.  In this kind of scenario, long distances and a variety of concerns beyond the usual nation state boundaries will require intelligence that broadens and enhances its means to  assess information around the globe which clandestine and covert actions cannot possibly cover, including and especially decoding extraterrestrial messages, data and information.  Contemplating the future of scientific intelligence  from today's standpoint requires merging new realities with what once were old fantasies.    Murphy, Jack.  2015.  How Technology is Changing the Future of Espionage.  SOFREP, Trusted News and Intelligence from SPEC OPS Veterans. https://sofrep.com/40315/technology-changing-future-espionage/   Wark, Wesley.   The Intelligence Revolution and the Future.  Central Intelligence Agency Library.  Studies Archives Indexes  Vol37No4.  https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol37no4/html/v37i4a04p_0001.htm Warner, Michael.  2012. Reflections on Technology and Intelligence Systems.  Intelligence & National Security.27(1):133. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/241713188_Reflections_on_Technology_and_IntelligenceSystems. FORUM WEEK 8 In approximately 250-500 words comment on the following: Assess current and future trends in espionage and counterespionage with respect to US national security.  For example, unmanned vehicles/drones, cloud computing/networked analytical capabilities, bio-technologies, increases in computing power and storage capacities, wireless technologies, digital imagery, mobile computing, stealth technologies, multi-spectral sensors, etc. Director of National Intelligence (DNI), Daniel Coats, testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee in February of this year. A general summary of his statements regarding present and potential threats includes the following: The risk of interstate conflict, including among great powers, is higher than at any time since the end of the Cold War.  The most immediate threats of regional interstate conflict in the immediate future will come from North Korea and Saudi-Iranian use of proxies in their rivalry. At the same time, the threat of state and nonstate use of weapons of mass destruction will continue to grow. Adversaries and malign actors will use all instruments of national power, including information and cyber means to shape societies and markets, international rules and institutions, and international hot spots to their advantage. China and Russia will seek spheres of influence and to check US appeal and influence in their regions. Forces for geopolitical order and stability will continue to fray, as will the rules-based international order.  New alignments and informal networks outside traditional power blocs and national governments will increasingly strain international cooperation. Tensions within many countries will rise, and the threat from Sunni violent extremist groups will evolve as they recoup after battlefield losses in the Middle East (2018). One of the key elements connecting geopolitical conflicts, power blocs and national governments as the above is data. The Intelligence Community (IC) calls it "broad scale data mining," the process of sifting through piles of intercepted data to find tiny shreds of “actionable” intelligence. Technology is going to drive future espionage,  and how to deal with data, keep it safe, and stop analysts from drowning in the mass of information, is the key challenge for the future (McCune 2015). James Maheny, the head of the government’s Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA), has as his main concern data destruction and what he calls the “next push of the envelope”: data manipulation, whereby adversaries subtly edit and corrupt information inside US computer systems, undermining confidence in government or industry records, or spreading dangerous or false information (2018).   Important information obtained through future intelligence methods ranging from sophisticated biometrics to Artificial Intelligence must be well protected to be useful.  If that future seems too far away, yesterday the Trump administration announced it is weighing turning soldiers into moles. Army Lt. Gen. Robert Ashley said the U.S. military is discussing the elevation of subterranean operations to an official warfighting domain (Johnson 2018).    Coats, Daniel.  2018. U.S. STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD. WORLDWIDE THREAT ASSESSMENT of the US INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.  Hearings before the United States Intelligence Committee.  115th Congress, February 13, 2018.  https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/2018-ATA---Unclassified-SSCI.pdf Natalie Johnson. 2018.  "Trump Administration Weighing Underground Military Force . "  The Washington Free Beacon, June 27, 2018.  http://freebeacon.com/national-security/trump-administration-weighing-underground-military-force/ Mahaney, James.  2018. “IARPA director: Encryption-busting quantum computers still decades away.” Interview by James Heckman.  Federal News Radio, March 15, 2018.  https://federalnewsradio.com/technology-main/2018/03/iarpa-director-encryption-busting-quantum-computers-coming-in-near-future/ McCune, Colleen.  2015. “Data Mining and Predictive Analysis: Intelligence Gathering and Crime Analysis.”  UK (Oxford): Butterworth-Heinemann. Murphy, Jack, Army Special Operations, and 5th Special Forces Group. "How Technology Is Changing the Future of Espionage." SOFREP. May 07, 2016. https://sofrep.com/40315/technology-changing-future-espionage/.

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