Transcript
INTEL 305 LAW AND ETHICS IN INTELLIGENCE
ORIGINAL FORUM POSTS
WEEK 1 Why was sorting out the future role of intelligence activities so important to US policymakers during the period of time right after World War II? What were they trying to accomplish? What did they accomplish?
Throughout World War II, even though the Soviet Union aligned with the United States to battle the Axis powers, their relationship was strained and conflicted. Most American citizens were suspicious of communism in the Soviet Union and relatively well-informed Americans were aware of Stalin’s tyranny. The Soviets, on the other hand, resented America’s late arrival into the war effort. Not only that, there was an acute disparity between the sacrifices befalling both countries throughout World War II. “What separates the battle histories of the war east of Berlin from the war west of it is the level of savagery” (Dykman, 2016). American military strategy was to surround and take the enemy captive, but the eastern clashes consisted mainly of brute-force frontal attacks approaching ‘annihilation’ (Dykman, 2016).
After the War, Russian-American grievances and grudges evolved into growing mutual distrust. Postwar, the Soviets expanded into Eastern Europe, giving rise to American concerns of Soviet global ambitions while, at the same time, the Soviets resented America’s postwar ‘bellicose rhetoric’ as well as the United States’ arms buildup and “interventionist approach to international relations” (History.com Staff, 2009). It is onto this backdrop of growing suspicion and global ambitions that the United States began to sort out and formulate intelligence approaches for the future.
American intelligence infrastructure during the War had been primarily based on the Great Britain model. “In the aftermath of World War II, with the Cold War looming on the horizon, the United States began the process of developing an elaborate peacetime intelligence structure that would extend across a number of governmental services and agencies” (National Security Agency, 1947-1989). In 1941, President Roosevelt appointed William J Donovan as Coordinator of Information to form a non-military intelligence organization. “Borrowing heavily from the British intelligence model, Donovan created a special staff to pull together and analyze all national security information” (Antoniou, 2013). The formal concept of centralized intelligence analysis was established for the first time in the United States government.
Following World War II, Americans sought a return to peace and normalcy and an end to wartime agencies. Transitioning from a war footing to peace time, US intelligence functions would require regrouping and refocus, at the same remaining capable of formidable responses while retooling the vision and scope of intelligence in a new postwar world. The Soviet Union remained a threat and “most American officials agreed that the best defense against the Soviet threat was a strategy called “containment.” George Kennan wrote, “The Soviet Union, was a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with the U.S. there can be no permanent modus vivendi [agreement between parties that disagree; as a result, America’s only choice was the “long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies” (1946). President Harry Truman agreed.
The Truman administration engaged in many-faceted debates regarding the future and form of intelligence capabilities. In 1941, William J Donovan was named Coordinator of Information to form a non-military intelligence organization. “Borrowing heavily from the British intelligence model, Donovan created a special staff to pull together and analyze all national security information” (Antoniou, 2013). The formal concept of centralized intelligence analysis was established for the first time in the United States government.
Those in favor of transitioning power to the State Department were against the Donovan approach while other elements of the Administrations favored a military course. In September 1945 Truman divided intelligence between the War and State Departments. State received the research and analysis function, combining it with the existing analytical office to form the Interim Research and Intelligence Service (IRIS).
On July 26, 1947, Congress passed the National Security Act which authorized the CIA as “an independent, central agency, but not a controlling one; it would both rival and complement the efforts of the departmental intelligence organizations (Appendix A, 1995).
“The Act also established the Director of Central Intelligence as the
head of the CIA and eventually the head of the US IC as a whole. The Act
set the foundation for the US Intelligence Community which would eventually
expand to the 17 different intelligence agencies we see today. The
National Security Act of 1947 also provided some limits for the US IC from
the beginning. The Act prevented the CIA from having any "police, subpoena,
law-enforcement, or internal security functions" (Appendix A, 1995).
The period immediately following World War II ushered in several major changes and reformations of the Intelligence Community. Some unity was achieved regarding collection and analysis, and matters or accountability and oversight were also addressed with action. Looking back now, in the light of history, it is easy to discern what they got right and what they missed while functioning in the shadow of the Cold War with limited perceptions. It seems to me, however, a strong foundation was put in place and, for the most part, the IC continues to learn and evolve from that positive starting place.
Antoniou, A. 2013. European Intelligence E-Book No.1. EU Intelligence Academy, 2013. Retrieved from: http://www.euintelligenceacademy.eu/sites/eia/files/EIA_REPORT_2013.pdf
Appendix A, 1995. "Appendix A: The Evolution of the US Intelligence Community - A Historical Overview." Retrieved from: https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/int022.html
Dykman, J. 2016. The Soviet Experience in World War Two. Eisenhower Institute at Getty College. May 11, 2016. Retrieved from: http://www.eisenhowerinstitute.org/about/living_history/wwii_soviet_experience.dot
History.com, Staff. 2009. Cold War History. 2009. Retrieved from: http://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/cold-war-history
Kennan, G. 1946. Long Telegram. The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State. National Security Archives, February 22, 1946. Retrieved from: https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm
National Security Agency. 1947-1989. The U.S. Intelligence Community: Organization, Operations and Management, 1947-1989. NSA Archives, n.d. Retrieved from: https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nsa/publications/ic/intelligence_com.html
