Transcript
The Battle of Stony Point
INTL 412: Espionage/Counterespionage
From a loose militia made up of part-time civilian soldiers to a combined conscript and volunteer force, America's espionage capacity has consistently adapted, sometimes seamlessly and often times in fits and starts. Whether out of necessity or by design, the early American fighting force was a composite of distinct diversity driven by Yankee ingenuity, including the involvement of highly-skilled young Americans who sometimes played pivotal, mostly unknown, secret roles in the making of the new nation. The Battle of Stony Point was crucial in restoring the Continental Army's flagging morale, as well as providing Benjamin Franklin renewed diplomatic cache to obtain additional French support for America's Revolution.
Battle and Context
Stony Point is never mentioned as a major battle of the Revolutionary War – such accolades are accorded legendary campaigns like Bunker Hill and Yorktown. The American victors left Stony Point behind barely two days after the battle, which lasted less than an hour. It was a small victory but a crucial one for the nation's then lagging troops. The Stony Point victory provided a huge boost for the morale of the Continental Army and strengthened the Americans' hold on upper New York, approximately forty miles from New York City.
The Battle of Stony Point took place on July 16, 1779. British war plans for 1779 were aggressive and ambitious. At the beginning of the year, Major General Henry Clinton received directives from Parliament to bring General Washington and his forces into a decisive head-on campaign. The plan was to "throw a force up the Hudson River to threaten the vital Hudson Highlands while a smaller force raided the Connecticut coast, ideally forcing Washington out of his West Point stronghold" (Washington's Library at Mount Vernon (WLMV) n.d., 4). Washington, however, continued to establish American troops in fortified positions around his primary American base, New York City, and refused to be drawn out of them.
Stony Point is a rocky peninsular abutment on the west side of the Hudson, rising to 150 feet at its highest point and extending a quarter-mile into the river. During May of 1779, British Major General Clinton and 8,000 fighting men, which included British Loyalists and German mercenaries, sailed up the Hudson River and occupied King's Ferry, a vital circuit for military supplies. Protecting this vital supply line to and from New England were two small forts on either side of the Hudson: Stony Point on the west and Verplanck's Point on the east. After capturing Fort Lafayette on the Hudson’s east bank, the British General and his troops quickly erected battlements along the uneven summit at Stony Point (Levine 2015, 2).
From King's Ferry the Brits traveled between the narrow points of the river from both sides and controlled passages through and into Hudson Highlands and West Point. Besides controlling water travel and supply routes, British troops were flush with a clipper ship, Royal Navy gunboats and apparatus, as well as heavy artillery. Upon securing Stony Point, so certain were the British of the fort's unassailable position, they nicknamed the strategic post "Little Gibraltar" (McFee 1913, 88).
Stony Point lacked the strong stone walls and dependable cannons of most forts. The British cut down the enveloping forest, using the razed trees to engineer an abatis (felled trees with sharpened points) from water to water across the river. The whole of the strategic territory was sharp and steep, making any approach by Americans nearly impossible. General Washington, monitoring the British activity from Buckberg Mountain, was intimately acquainted with the hostile terrain (Levine 2015, 1-4).
Washington continued tracking the British at Stony Point from Buckberg Mountain for several weeks and began to develop a strategy and corresponding battle plan. It was simple enough: Brigadier General Anthony Wayne would lead a surprise midnight assault against Stony Point. The unexpected attack would offset proportionate American troop deficits, and the late-night trap would certainly catch the British off guard and unprepared. For months, since early Spring, General Clinton sought to maneuver (or outmaneuver) Washington into a full outward defense by an attack on Middlebrook, New Jersey, and later by raging through coastal Connecticut.
Rather than engaging Clinton at Middlebrook, Washington marched his troops north from Middlebrook to protect West Point. Clinton then took possession of Stony Point and Verplanck's Point. These spots were chosen because they were near a strategically narrow point in the river where the King's Ferry crossed, and, as such, the key to controlling passage into the Hudson Highlands and West Point. General Clinton then launched raids against Connecticut coastal towns, in the continuing attempt to lure Washington into battle. It was clear the British could not be allowed to remain at Stony Point (Johnston 2012, 44).
The Connecticut rampage by the British was particularly brutal, but it did not move Washington or his troops from their garrisons near the Hudson. "The true master of the situation was Washington." His persistence in remaining immobile, regardless of the actions of the enemy, and his poise in deflecting British challenges kept his forces safe and intact until they were battle ready and sufficiently strong to take on the enemy (Johnston 2012, 59).
Washington continually monitored his opportunities. His final decision was a midnight raid on Stony Point and, if successful, a later, similar late-night attack on Verrplanck's Point. General Anthony Wayne ("Mad Anthony") was summoned to Buckberg Mountain and the two commanders prepared a meticulous plan. The troops called on to storm Stony Point ahead of regular infantry were the elite of the Continental Army known as the Light Brigade. Every officer in the Brigade had been selected by General Washington. The average age of the Brigade troop was 20 years and it was the Army’s most seasoned and well-trained unit, “the Navy Seals of the day” (Sheehan n.d., 1-3).
Wayne's troops began their march from Fort Montgomery, near the present-day Bear Mountain Bridge. Reaching Stony Point close to midnight, two columns swept up the treeless slopes, and a third went up the cliffs, arriving at the fort within minutes of each other. The two riverside columns then crept up the hill and a group of volunteers, called the “forlorn hope” for their dangerous mission, were first in, charged with breaking the abatis with picks and axes. American troops then crossed the broken defenses and stormed the fort. It was a bloody fight, but it was also quick, and, by 2 am on July 16, Wayne sent a letter to Washington reporting the fort captured (Johnston 2012, 57).
Three days later, realizing that Stony Point could not be defended against the combined might of the British army and navy, Washington abandoned Stony Point. Although the British returned to Stony Point and rebuilt the fort, British troops were withdrawn in October due to insufficient reinforcements, and never again threatened the Hudson Highlands. The victory at Stony Point was the last major battle in the north and boosted Army morale as well as reinvigorating the war-weary American public.
Analysis, Precedence, Leadership.
In the late 18th century, massed troops in open battle spaces were still the warfare norm. Many engagements were agreed upon in advance and featured tangents of massed combatants maneuvered as single entities around the battlefield. Popular mythology had it that American colonists were snipers picking off the British Redcoats and carrying out other guerilla tactics on a daily basis. “This is a myth of the American Revolution” (Varasadi 1989). The military gains made by the colonists only increased after the Continental Army was trained and disciplined in the formal methods of European warfare.
Baron Frederick von Steuben, an expert in Prussian warfare, was brought on by General Washington to put standard methodology to work in the American army. Through his training and discipline Steuben created a regular army matching the British in tactics and methods. Americans troops began to defeat the British on the battlefield, becoming formidable foes for the British on the open ground.
Tethered to his respect for traditional warfare was Washington’s capacity to think outside the box. Rather than attack Stony Point frontally, Washington and General Anthony Wayne decided on a stealth approach. They called in the Corps of Light Infantry, formed only one month earlier. This was the Army’s most seasoned and well-trained unit, bred for the attack. Formed in the spring of 1779, it drilled under Wilhelm von Steuben, who emphasized discipline and skill with the bayonet, giving a keen edge to men already hardened to the core, trained to fight outside of linear formation and to go where needed.
In a single timeline, Washington’s capacity to hold forth well-worn traditions, and embrace new tactics and methods was boldly on display. “Warfare had never been done like this before by the Americans. It proved that the painful training done in previous years was solid, and proved that this was an effective fighting force” (Sheehan 2014, 2).
Once the plan was complete, Washington gave Wayne his instructions, encouraging him to change the plan as he thought necessary. Washington’s difficult days in 1779 were met with poised leadership, trust for his commanders in the field, and a skillful capacity to recognize and seize opportunities with little concern for how things had always been done. It was not always that way.
During the War, Washington’s mistakes were often due to his failings as a strategist. The Continental Army was defeated on Long Island because General Washington failed to reconnoiter sufficiently and tried to defend an area too large for his army. He was notorious for his inability to make rapid decisions and, in a dangerous oversight, failed to realize the importance of supporting the campaigns in the South. Thomas Paine once accused Washington of sleeping away the war, but there was strong overall agreement that “Washington’s character, judgment, industry and meticulous habits, as well as his political and diplomatic skills, set him apart from others. In the final analysis, he was the proper choice to serve as commander of the Continental Army” (Ferling 2010, 6).
One major Washington success was his draft acceptance of Baron von Steuben upon the recommendations of Congress. Baron von Steuben introduced a system of progressive training for recruits which educated them in the basics of soldiering. Washington was impressed and grateful for von Steuben's work. He successfully petitioned Congress to permanently appoint von Steuben inspector general with the rank and pay of a major general. This request was granted on May 5, 1778. Many of Steuben’s writings are still in use in today’s military manuals. Steuben’s Blue Book led to the publication of the first official Noncommissioned Officer Guide in 1904. In 2015, the 10th Edition of the NCO Guide was once again reprinted. At their core, the responsibilities of NCOs in 1779 are largely the same today.
The few years surrounding the Battle of Stony Point provide a treasure trove of meaningful innovations, much-needed reforms, balanced leadership and espionage/intelligence successes. Once again, with a closer look, the commonplace American soldier responded in uncommon ways to leaders they respected and admired, those whom they would follow to hell and back and, sometimes during the fitful battles of the American Revolution, they did just that.
References
Ferling, John. 2010. Myths of the American Revolution. Smithsonian Magazine. (January).
Johnston, Henry. 2012. The Storming of Stony Point on the Hudson, Midnight, July 15, 1779: Its Importance in the Light. London: Forgotten Books.
Levine, David. 2015. How Washington Won the Battle of Stony Point. Hudson Valley Historical Society Magazine.
Loprieno, Don. 2004. The Enterprise in Contemplation: The Midnight Assault of Stony Point. UK: Maias Books.
McFee, Inez. 1923. American Heroes from History. Chicago: A. Flanagan Company.
Sheehan, Michael. 2014. The Unsuccessful American Attempt on Verplanck Point, July 16-19, 1779. Journal of the American Revolution. Yardley, PA: Westholme Publishing.
Varasadi, Allen. 1989. Myth Information. NY: Ballantine Books.
O'Donnell, Patrick. 2016. Washington's Immortals: The Untold Story of an Elite Regiment Who Changed the Course of the Revolution. New York, NY: Grove/Atlantic.
Washington's Library at Mount Vernon (WLMV). n.d. The Battle at Stony Point. The Fred W. Smith National Library for the Study of George Washington at Mount Vernon. NY: Mountain Vernon.
