A perfectly competitive steel mill that produces large amounts of pollution (a negative externality) will, from a social point of view,
a. produce too little steel.
b. produce the socially optimal quantity of steel.
c. produce too much steel.
d. produce too much steel only if it installs pollution control equipment.
QUESTION 2In the case of a negative externality, the social marginal cost will
a. exceed the private marginal cost.
b. be equal to private marginal cost.
c. fall short of private marginal cost.
d. bear no significant relation to private marginal cost.
QUESTION 3Suppose residents of Toadhop live on the Quabache River, a river prone to flooding. Suppose there are 1000 (type A) people who value flood control more than the 1000 (type B) people. Type A Demand QD = 100 P Type B Demand QD = 50 P Where Q measures the quality of flood control. If the price of a unit of flood control is 100,000 and the citizens of Toadhop gather for a townhall meeting to find the socially optimal level of flood control, and they are successful, how much will each type B individual contribute in total?
a. 1875
b. 1500
c. 875
d. 625
QUESTION 4Suppose residents of Toadhop live on the Quabache River, a river prone to flooding. Suppose there are 1000 (type A) people who value flood control more than the 1000 (type B) people. Type A Demand QD = 100 P Type B Demand QD = 50 P Where Q measures the quality of flood control. If the price of a unit of flood control is 100000 and the citizens of Toadhop gather for a townhall meeting to find the socially optimal level of flood control, and they are successful, how much will each type A individual contribute in total?
a. 1875
b. 1500
c. 875
d. 625
QUESTION 5Suppose residents of Toadhop live on the Quabache River, a river prone to flooding. Suppose there are 1000 (type A) people who value flood control more than the 1000 (type B) people. Type A Demand QD = 100 P Type B Demand QD = 50 P Where Q measures the quality of flood control. If the price of a unit of flood control is 100,000 and the citizens of Toadhop gather for a townhall meeting to find the socially optimal level of flood control, and they are successful, how much will type B individuals contribute per unit of flood control?
a. 25
b. 50
c. 75
d. 100
QUESTION 6Suppose residents of Toadhop live on the Quabache River, a river prone to flooding. Suppose there are 1000 (type A) people who value flood control more than the 1000 (type B) people. Type A Demand QD = 100 P Type B Demand QD = 50 P Where Q measures the quality of flood control. If the price of a unit of flood control is 100,000 and the citizens of Toadhop gather for a townhall meeting to find the socially optimal level of flood control, and they are successful, they will pick Q equal to
a. 0
b. 10
c. 25
d. 70