Starting with Colin, use successive elimination of dominated strategies to find all the pure-strateg

Consider the rivalry between Airbus and Boeing to develop a new commercial jet aircraft. Suppose Boeing is ahead in the development process and Airbus is considering whether to enter the competition. If Airbus stays out, it earns 0 profit, whereas Boeing enjoys a monopoly and earns a profit of $1 billion. If Airbus decides to enter and develop the rival airplane, then Boeing has to decide whether to accommodate Airbus peaceably or to wage a price war. In the event of peaceful competition, each firm will make a profit of $300 million. If there is a price war, each will lose $100 million because the prices of airplanes will fall so low that neither firm will be able to recoup its development costs.
Draw the tree for this game. Find the rollback equilibrium and describe the firms’ equilibrium strategies.

Consider the game illustrated below: (i) identify how many pure strategies are available to each player and list them; (ii) identify the rollback equilibrium outcome and the complete equilibrium strategy for each player.

Starting with Colin, use successive elimination of dominated strategies to find all the pure-strategy Nash equilibria for the following game. Describe the process that you used to find the equilibria. Use this game to explain why it is important to describe an equilibrium by using the strategies employed by the players, not merely by the payoffs received in equilibrium.