Transcript
“Account for the implementation of Direct Rule in 1972 & the failure of the Sunningdale Power-Sharing Executive in May 1974.”
The failure of Northern Ireland’s ‘Majority (Unionist) Rule’ system occurred during a period of widespread civil and political unrest. The Civil Rights Movement, centred around the organisation for equality in housing, employment & education (NICRA), was a symptom of the widespread division within Northern Irish Society. With the IRA on full offensive, and the clear inability of the Stormont Government to either deal effectively with security issues or compromise with the growing social movement for equality, Westminster made the decision to effectively ‘defuse’ an incendiary situation by assuming direct control from Westminster. Internment without trial, ‘Gerrymandering’ and ‘Bloody Sunday‘ all contributed to an air of lawlessness and disenchantment within the Nationalist Community, while Unionists felt that aside from social and political issues, they were being targeted openly by a Republican terrorist organisation attempting to end their Union with Britain and force them into a United Ireland. Westminster dissolved the Stormont Government and implemented ‘Direct Rule’ as of March 1973. (The Direct Rule Act was passed into law in 1972.)
The first step in Direct Rule administration was to appoint a Secretary of State for Northern Ireland – William Whitelaw. Whitelaw’s position was to assume and direct Westminster policy IN Northern Ireland with a view to pacifying the escalating violence and create a dialogue whereby Nationalists & Unionists could agree on a way forward together. ‘Operation Motorman’. targeting ‘no-go’ areas in Nationalist as well as some Loyalist areas, effectively helped to consolidate the rule of law, albeit with the use of a modern army. While it was mainly targeted against Nationalist ’no-go’ areas, Whitelaw was shrewd enough to be seen to be applying the heavy hand of the law to BOTH sections of the divided society.
Having made some progress on the security issue, Whitelaw began proposals on a future government for Northern Ireland. From the outset, Whitelaw made it clear that it would have to be a ”twin-track” approach, running in parallel to each other. With Power-Sharing as the immediate and local political solution, Whitelaw also proposed an “Irish Dimension”. Whereas most Unionists would have traditionally favoured ‘Majority Rule’ as opposed to “Power-Sharing”, the idea of an “Irish Dimension” (Council of Ireland) was generally frighteningly out of the question to the vast majority. Whereas Power-Sharing would prove to problematic but not impossible, the concept of an All-Ireland ‘Council of Ireland’, would prove a bridge too far, too soon for Unionists. Nonetheless, Whitelaw pressed ahead with talks between British & Irish Nationalist representatives from Northern Ireland. Even the British Prime Minister, Edward Heath, expressed that any solution would be “accepted by and acceptable to the Republic”. This clearly enraged many Unionists.
In an effort to undermine Republican violence and strengthen moderate Nationalism, Whitelaw used John Hume of the SDLP as a ‘go-between’ to negotiate a ceasefire from the IRA. When this was achieved, and Republican demands were seen to be impossible, IRA violence continued. In an effort to bring the Republic on board, Whitelaw persisted with his ‘twin-track’ approach. Ultimately, these proposals would result in a split in the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) led by Brian Faulkner. Those within the UUP Party who supported the concept of Power-Sharing, led by Brian Faulkner, became ‘pledged’ Unionists; while those who opposed it, led by Harry West, became ‘un-pledged’ Unionists. This split in the UUP would be crucial to the failure of the Sunningdale Executive; it could no longer be claimed that Unionist opposition was merely of an ‘extreme’ nature. Opposition was clearly widespread within Unionism, whereas support for Power-Sharing was exclusive amongst a small group of Faulkner’s supporters and the very moderate, mainstream Alliance Party.
When the Power-Sharing Executive was formed in December 1973, 6 UUP members became Ministers, along with Faulkner as Chief Executive. 4 SDLP and 1 Alliance Ministers completed the Executive that was to sit in the newly-formed Power-Sharing Assembly. While this represented concrete progress for Power-Sharing, opposition to equally well-mobilised. A conglomeration of many Unionist Parties and groups came together to form the UUUC – United Ulster Unionist Council. DUP, Vanguard, ‘Un-Pledged’ UUP members as well as the Orange Order formed a serious and volatile opposition to Power-Sharing. The activities and rhetoric of the UUUC openly attacked Faulkner and his ‘Pledged’ unionists for betraying ‘Majority Rule’ and stirred up traditional Unionist dogmatic resistance. They also provided the platform for further resistance to Power-Sharing.
While the Power-Sharing Executive attempted to get to grips with day-to-day matters in Northern Ireland, the advent of the ‘Council of Ireland’ also served to increase mainstream Unionist opposition and discomfort with the Sunningdale Executive.
By May of 1974, opposition had increased to such an extent that the UWC (Ulster Workers’ Council) staged a strike outside of Stormont Buildings. While the Army and RUC crucially made little or no effort to remove the protestors, the UWC also set up roadblocks and seized businesses and utility stations such as electricity power stations. This in itself was the nail in the coffin for Sunningdale, as opponents to Power-Sharing now held the power, literally, to bring everyday business and life in Northern Ireland to a grinding halt. Merlyn Rees, as the 2nd Secretary of State for N. Ireland, showed little or no leadership in directing or insisting on RUC and/or British Army discipline in relation to breaking the UWC Strike.
