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Satsume Satsume
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6 years ago
Refer to Scenario 17.3.  Moral hazard arises in this situation because once the firm
A) pays the premium that is based on the 0.001 probability, it has no incentive to spend the additional $80 for the fire protection program, so the true probability of loss is no longer 0.001.
B) pays the premium that is based on the 0.01 probability, it has no incentive to spend the additional $80 for the fire protection program, so the true probability of loss is no longer 0.01.
C) puts the fire protection program in place, it has less incentive to spend $300 for a premium, leaving the firm underinsured.
D) puts the fire protection program in place, it has less incentive to spend $6,000 for a premium, leaving the firm underinsured.
E) puts the fire protection program in place, it will consider that a substitute for insurance and not be able to deal with the loss from a fire should it occur.
Textbook 
Microeconomics

Microeconomics


Edition: 8th
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Bart_argBart_arg
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6 years ago
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