In a principal-agent problem, if the contract used leads to the maximum of the principal's and agent's combined value (profits, payoffs), we can say that this contract features
A) inefficiency in production, since only the principal's profits should be maximized.
B) inefficiency in production, since only the agent's payoffs should be maximized.
C) efficiency in production.
D) inefficiency in production, since the agent's payoffs should be maximized and the principal's profits should be minimized.
QUESTION 2In the presence of asymmetric information, a piece-rate contract
A) achieves production efficiency.
B) can lead to agents producing more output than would occur under a fixed-rent-paid-to-the-principal contract.
C) is impossible to write.
D) will result in the principal earning all of the profit.
QUESTION 3In the presence of asymmetric information, a hire contract
A) achieves production efficiency.
B) can lead to opportunistic behavior on the part of the agent.
C) is impossible to write.
D) will result in the principal earning all of the profit.
QUESTION 4In the presence of asymmetric information, a contingent contract
A) achieves production efficiency.
B) can lead to opportunistic behavior on the part of the agent.
C) is impossible to write.
D) will result in the principal earning all of the profit.
QUESTION 5In the presence of asymmetric information, the only contract that results in production efficiency and no moral hazard is the one in which
A) the agent receives a fixed fee.
B) the principal receives a fixed rent.
C) profit is shared.
D) revenue is shared.
QUESTION 6Sue offers to pay Al 50 for each painting of his that she sells in her gallery. Each painting sells for 75. The cost to Al of producing each painting is 55. Which of the following statements is TRUE about this contract?
A) This contract is efficient.
B) This contract maximizes joint profit.
C) Al will not participate in this contract.
D) This is a fixed-fee contract.