× Didn't find what you were looking for? Ask a question
Top Posters
Since Sunday
5
a
5
k
5
c
5
B
5
l
5
C
4
s
4
a
4
t
4
i
4
r
4
New Topic  
Satsume Satsume
wrote...
Posts: 761
Rep: 0 0
6 years ago
Megan and Amanda are both 7 years old and operate lemonade stands.  Megan lives on the east side of Welch Avenue while Amanda resides on the west side of Welch Avenue.  Each morning, the girls must decide whether to place their stand on Welch Avenue or Lincoln Avenue.  When they set their stand-up, they don't know what the other will do and can't relocate.  If both girls put their stand on Welch, both girls receive $175 in profits.  If both girls put their stand on Lincoln, they each receive $75 in profits.  If one girl sets their stand on Welch while the other operates on Lincoln, the stand on Welch earns $300 in profits while the stand on Lincoln earns $225.  Diagram the relevant pay-off matrix.  Does either girl have a dominant strategy?  Does the game have a Nash equilibrium?  What is the maximin strategy of each player in the game?
Textbook 
Microeconomics

Microeconomics


Edition: 8th
Author:
Read 69 times
1 Reply

Related Topics

Replies
wrote...
6 years ago
Neither player has a dominant strategy in this game.  There are two Nash equilibria in this game.  The first Nash equilibrium is where Megan places her stand on Welch while Amanda places her stand on Lincoln.  The second Nash equilibrium occurs where Megan places her stand on Lincoln while Amanda places her stand on Welch.  The maximin strategy for both players will be to avoid the $75 pay-off.  To do this, the player will never choose to locate on Lincoln.  If both players do this, the result will be for both players to locate on Welch.
New Topic      
Explore
Post your homework questions and get free online help from our incredible volunteers
  1372 People Browsing
Related Images
  
 656
  
 259
  
 611
Your Opinion