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nakungth nakungth
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Posts: 1175
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7 years ago
Glen's friend Andre is a big strong guy.  Andre will not allow anyone to harm Glen.  Glen enjoys teasing people.  In fact, Glen's marginal benefit of teasing people is given by: MB(Q) = 75 - 10Q.    Generally, people do not enjoy Glen teasing them.  Thus, they retaliate to Glen's teasing.  Without Andre around to protect Glen from the retaliation, Glen's marginal cost of teasing people is
MC(Q) = 20Q due to the retaliation.  However, with Andre around, Glen perceives his marginal costs of teasing to always be zero as no one will retaliate with Andre around.  This is because Andre will step in to protect Glen from retaliation.  Without Andre around, what is Glen's choice for teasing?  How much does Glen increase teasing when Andre's around?  Is Glen's behavior characteristic of a moral hazard or adverse selection?
Textbook 
Microeconomics

Microeconomics


Edition: 8th
Author:
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CanihCanih
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Posts: 463
7 years ago
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nakungth Author
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7 years ago
Thanks for your help!!
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Yesterday
You make an excellent tutor!
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2 hours ago
I appreciate what you did here, answered it right Smiling Face with Open Mouth
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