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jc123 jc123
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7 years ago
Monitoring is often used by firms in an attempt to decrease
 
  A) shirking.
  B) piece rates.
  C) adverse selection.
  D) signaling.

QUESTION 2

If a firm has established monitoring devices that have a 50 chance of detecting shirking, and an employee gains 5,000 from shirking, the employer can deter shirking by having employees post a bond equal to
 
  A) 2,500.
  B) 5,000.
  C) 10,000.
  D) 50,000.

QUESTION 3

Sarah's demand for routine medical visits is q = 10 - 0.2p when she is healthy and q = 20 - 0.2p when she is sick. Medical visits cost 50 each if Sarah has no medical insurance. She is sick 20 of the time. Sarah is considering two different insurance plans. One offers free medical visits; the other plan costs less up front but requires that Sarah pay 5 per medical visit. Compare the two plans in terms of the trade-off between risk and moral hazard.
 
  What will be an ideal response?

QUESTION 4

Sam hires an attorney to present a court case. If Sam wins the case, he will receive some money. This payoff is a function of the attorney's hours and which judge is assigned the case that day. Judge A is very understanding toward people in Sam's position, but judge B is very harsh toward people like Sam. Is it possible for Sam to get the attorney to deliver the optimal amount of effort and make the attorney bear all of the risk?
 
  What will be an ideal response?

QUESTION 5

If information is asymmetric, explain why the hire contract is not efficient in production and a moral hazard exists, but the fixed fee to the principal contract is efficient and does not pose a moral hazard problem.
 
  What will be an ideal response?

QUESTION 6

Rents for stores at shopping malls are usually tied to the profits of the store. Comment on how this arrangement affects the mall owner's income versus a fixed rent.
 
  What will be an ideal response?
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wrote...
7 years ago
[Answer to ques. #1]  A

[Answer to ques. #2]  C

[Answer to ques. #3]  At 50 per visit, Sarah makes no visits when she is healthy and 10 visits when she is sick. Under the first plan, she makes 10 visits when she is healthy and 20 visits when she is sick. Thus, Sarah will make 10 more visits with the first insurance plan. Under the second plan, Sarah makes 9 visits when she is healthy and 19 visits when she is sick. The moral hazard is greater (by one visit) under the first plan. Under the first plan, Sarah's risk is zero. She pays only the up-front premium regardless of her health. Under the second plan she will make (0.8  9 ) + (0.2  19 ) = 11 visits at 5 each. Her risk, as measured by the variance of her expenditures, is (0.8  100 ) + (0.2  1600 ) = 400. Thus, the second plan is riskier for her but generates less of a moral hazard on her part.

[Answer to ques. #4]  Yes. If Sam accepts a fixed payment from the attorney and lets the attorney keep the proceeds, if any, from the case, the attorney bears all of the risk. Since the attorney will enjoy the full marginal benefit of her effort, she puts in the optimal level of effort.

[Answer to ques. #5]  With the hire contract, the agent has no incentive to behave in such a manner as to maximize the joint profit of the agent and the principal. The contract provides no incentive for the agent to behave optimally, and the contract does nothing to prevent moral hazard. The agent can usually increase his value of the contract by committing a moral hazard. The fixed fee to the principal contract gives the agent all the profit after the fee to the principal is paid. This provides an incentive for the agent to behave optimally and maximize the profit of the firm. The agent's desire to behave optimally prevents moral hazard.

[Answer to ques. #6]  It is likely that such an arrangement reduces the mall owner's income. When paying a fixed rent, the store operates efficiently. When having to share the profit with the mall owner, the store owner has a reduced marginal benefit without a reduction in her marginal cost. With downward sloping benefits, the store owner will maximize their profit by selling less. A fixed rent will incentivize the store owner to maximize store profits, and the owner can capture total profits through the rent. Additionally, when having to share the profit, the store owner has the incentive to lie about the store's profit. From the mall owner's perspective, a profit-sharing contract gives her the incentive to make expenditures (maintenance) that increase the number of mall customers and, possibly, the store's profit.
jc123 Author
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7 years ago
Thank you Slight Smile
wrote...
7 years ago
Pleasure
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