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12341243124 12341243124
wrote...
Posts: 500
Rep: 1 0
6 years ago
Suppose employees pay a bond of 1,000 to an employer. The gain from shirking is 400. Monitoring devices have been installed so that there is a 50 chance of being caught if you are shirking. The company is considering the installation of additional monitoring devices to increase the chance of catching a shirker to 100. They feel this is needed to deter all shirking. What is your recommendation to the company? Explain.
 
  What will be an ideal response?

QUESTION 2

Suppose an employer has monitoring devices established so that the probability of an employee being caught while shirking is 0.2. If the gain to the employee from shirking is 1,000, how large a bond will deter shirking?
 
  What will be an ideal response?

QUESTION 3

Suppose the probability of an employee being caught shirking, q, is a function of the employer's monitoring, M, such that q = M/100. If workers must put up a 1,000 bond and the gain to each worker from shirking is 100, what is the employer's optimal level of monitoring that is just sufficient to discourage shirking?
 
  What will be an ideal response?

QUESTION 4

Explain why a firm may hire managers to operate outlets near the firm's headquarters, but may sell franchise rights for the outlets located greater distances from the headquarters. (With a franchise, the firm sells a brand name and a method of doing business to someone who then owns and operates the outlet.)
 
  What will be an ideal response?

QUESTION 5

When shirking at the workplace occurs, increased monitoring of workers is the only effective way to reduce this behavior.
 
  Indicate whether the statement is true or false

QUESTION 6

A major problem inherent in posting bonds is that
 
  A) workers are not trustworthy.
  B) workers may not have enough wealth to post them.
  C) workers cannot find co-signers.
  D) All of the above.

QUESTION 7

A firm uses an efficiency wage scheme to deter workers from shirking. Suppose a risk-neutral worker that has a reservation wage of 1000. The industry ongoing wage is 2,000. The efficiency wage paid by this firm is 7,000. What is this firm's shirking detection rate?
 
  A) 5
  B) 20
  C) 10
  D) 25
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wrote...
6 years ago
[Answer to ques. #1]  Shirking is already deterred; the company does not need any more monitoring devices. The employee gains 400 by shirking but has an expected loss of 500 (loses 1,000 with 50 probability).

[Answer to ques. #2]  B = 1000/0.2 = 5,000. With a 5,000 bond and a 20 chance of being caught, the employee's gain from shirking just equals the expected cost of shirking.

[Answer to ques. #3]  Workers are deterred from shirking if q = G/B = 0.10. Ten units of monitoring are necessary to achieve q = 0.10.

[Answer to ques. #4]  To avoid moral hazard problems, the firm must monitor the managers of the outlets. The firm can cost-effectively monitor operations near the headquarters. However, the cost of monitoring rises the farther away the outlet is located. Thus, the firm may earn more profit by franchising the outlets located far from the headquarters instead of trying to monitor them.

[Answer to ques. #5]  False. There are other means of reducing shirking, such as an efficiency wage, bonding workers, or screening applicants.

[Answer to ques. #6]  B

[Answer to ques. #7]  B
12341243124 Author
wrote...
6 years ago
Smiling Face with Open Mouth that's the expression my face made when I got the notification email
wrote...
6 years ago
glad I put that smile on your face Happy Dummy
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