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pirex pirex
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6 years ago
Suppose the probability of an employee being caught shirking, q, is a function of the employer's monitoring, M, such that q = M/100. If workers must put up a $1,000 bond and the gain to each worker from shirking is $100, what is the employer's optimal level of monitoring that is just sufficient to discourage shirking?
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Microeconomics

Microeconomics


Edition: 6th
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And if you call, I will answer
And if you fall, I'll pick you up
And if you court this disaster
I'll point you home
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TecShdwTecShdw
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6 years ago
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pirex Author
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6 years ago
Brilliant ツ
lierac00
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Yesterday
Helped a lot
carston
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2 hours ago
Thanks
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