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Mairoon Mairoon
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6 years ago
A firm operates and produces pollution that only harms an individual, Bob. The firm and Bob both know the costs and benefits of reducing pollution. Neither the firm nor Bob acts strategically while bargaining, and there are no transaction costs associated with bargaining. Explain how the efficient level of pollution occurs no matter whether the firm or Bob owns the property right to pollution.
Textbook 
Microeconomics

Microeconomics


Edition: 6th
Author:
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Replies
wrote...
6 years ago
If the firm has the right to pollute, then Bob can bargain with the firm. Bob will pay the firm up to the point where his per unit payment to reduce the pollution equals the marginal benefit he receives from pollution. This will be the efficient level of pollution. If Bob has the right to have no pollution, then the firm will pay to pollute until this cost equals the marginal benefit of a unit of production. This will result in the efficient level of pollution. Thus, no matter which party owns the property right, the efficient level of pollution will result.
Mairoon Author
wrote...
5 years ago
Perfect
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